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I. INTRODUCTION
As the title suggests, this will be a dispassionate essay. I will not
take sides concerning which political branch of the current federal gov-
ernment, the President or the Congress, is embarked on a course that is
more likely to impair the appropriate role of American administrative
law in structuring and checking administrative action. Nor will I at-
tempt to determine whether ignorance of, or cynicism about, the law is
the greater sin for would-be designers of public institutions. My stance
is that of a neutral observer: a chronicler of current events and an ana-
lyst of their implications for the role of law in an imploding administra-
tive state.
The thesis of this article is straightforward: Reform of the admin-
• Sterling Professor of Law, Yale University. This paper is a slightly revised version of a
talk presented at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law's Second Century Conference, Sep-
tember 21-22, 1995.
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istrative state is on everyone's agenda. The executive branch is busily
"reinventing government" to make it more effective. Congress is pro-
posing major "regulatory reform" legislation to promote more efficient
and responsive regulation.1 Both initiatives are deeply problematic. The
reinvention effort, by analogizing public to private action, confuses
managing with governing. It therefore ignores the crucial legitimating
role of public, particularly administrative, law. The congressional "reg-
ulatory reform" initiative, by contrast, exalts and exploits legal process.
But the proposed "reforms" seem designed largely to skew, delay or
thwart, rather than improve, administrative policy choice. Moreover,
these independently destructive executive and legislative reform pro-
grams have a potential negative synergy. They may thus simultane-
ously undermine important legal norms while making government less
effective.
II. MYOPIC MANAGERIALISM: THE REINVENTION INITIATIVE
Presidents and Congresses have always competed for the alle-
giance of implementing officials.2 Such, for good and ill, is our constitu-
tional design. Whether this competition increases democracy and pre-
serves freedom, or renders government inefficient and unaccountable,
remains controversial. My interest, however, is in the contemporary
terms of this ongoing debate-the rhetorical armaments with which
each side pummels the other in the name of good government.
At least since the Brownlee Committee created the idea of the
chief executive virtually from whole cloth,3 the President's main claims
have sounded in managerial efficiency.4 Franklin Roosevelt said as
much in seeking an end to government by "independent commission"
and the authority to reorganize the executive branch.5 He got the lat-
1. A number of bills have been introduced. For a discussion of the major contenders see Bob
Benenson, Procedural Overhaul Fails After Three Tough Votes, CONGo Q. WKLY. REP., July 24,
1995, at 2159-62.
2. For a detailed history of the competition that exists between the legislative and executive
branches of government, see JAMES L. SUNDQUIST. THE DECLINE AND RESURGENCE OF CONGRESS
(1986).
3. PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT. REPORT OF THE COMMIT-
TEE 40-41 (1937) referred to what it called "our constitutional ideal of a fully coordinated Execu-
tive Branch responsible to the President" and in apocalyptic language referred to independent
regulatory committees as constituting "a headless fourth branch of the government by haphazard
deposit of irresponsible agencies and uncoordinated powers."
4. SUNDQUIST, supra note 2, at 57-60.
5. Id. at 52-55.
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ter,S but the power to reorganize is not the power to direct. As Harry
Truman famously remarked, "He'll sit here and he'll say, 'Do this! Do
that!' And nothing will happen. Poor Ike-it won't be a bit like the
Army."7 But Presidents have continued to seek control through mana-
gerial initiatives. Richard Nixon resuscitated FDR's reorganization au-
thority and gained legislative approval for a vastly expanded Executive
Office of the President.s If the President was not to have direct author-
ity to control every federal administrative appointee (Roosevelt's la-
ment), he would at least have a staff-perhaps sufficient-to evaluate,
coordinate and monitor the far-flung executive establishment.
More recently, Ronald Reagan, as chief executive officer
("CEO"), pioneered the use of the Vice President as chief operating
officer ("COO"), giving George Bush a domestic portfolio of regulatory
relief activities designed to tame a fractious regulatory bureaucracy.9
AI Gore is the current inheritor of this mantle, passed down from Bush
through his Vice President Dan Quayle. Gore has taken to the job with
enthusiasm, producing not one, but two, National Performance Re-
views ("NPRs").lo These NPRs are major proposals for revitaliza-
tion-in his terms, reinvention-of the federal administrative
establishment.
Without a tedious recounting of the linked history of presidential
6. For a history of the authorization and use of reorganization plans from the New Deal
until the Nixon administration, see SUNDQUIST, supra note 2, at 52-55. Prior to Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), reorganization authority had always pro-
vided for a presidential proposal that went into effect absent a "congressional veto." Chadha's
invalidation of the legislative veto caused subsequent reorganization authority to be cast in the
form of a presidential proposal followed by a congressional statute under a "fast-track" procedure.
See Reorganization Act Amendments of 1984 § 3(a), Pub. L. No. 98-614, 98 Stat. 3192 (codified
at 5 U.S.C. § 906 (1988».
7. RiCHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER: THE POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP 9 (1960)
(emphasis omitted).
8. See description in Morton Rosenberg, Beyond the Limits ofExecutive Power: Presiden-
tial Control of Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291,80 MICH. L. REV. 193,221-
25 (1981). For a more detailed treatment, see LARRY BERMAN, THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT
AND BUDGET AND THE PRESIDENCY, 1921-1979, at 105-25 (1979).
9. Lester M. Salamon & Alan J. Abramson, Governance: The Politics ofRetrenchment, in
THE REAGAN RECORD 44 (John L. Palmer & Isabel V. Sawhill eds., 1984).
10. AL GORE, FROM RED TAPE TO RESULTS: CREATING A GOVERNMENT THAT WORKS BET-
TER AND COSTS LESS; REpORT OF THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW (1993) [hereinafter
NPR I]; Reinventing the Federal Government-Phase II, in BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1996, at 141-57 (1995) [hereinafter NPR II]. The NPR is actually
an ongoing process of reports, recommendations, legislative proposals, executive orders, and other
activities. For a record of NPR activities in the first year, see AL GORE, CREATING A GOVERN-
MENT THAT WORKS BETTER AND COSTS LESS: STATUS REPORT (1994).
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administrative initiatives against the backdrop of ever-changing Ameri-
can managerial enthusiasms, it is safe to say that none of our "Chief
Executives," or their COOs, have been immune to the management
fraternities' panaceas du jour. Roosevelt's demands for straight lines of
executive authorityll reflected Taylorist visions of hierarchical con-
trop2 Nixon staffed up in response to a decade or more of academic
emphasis on analytic capacity as the key to rational decision making in
organizations.IS Today, Taylor has been turned on his head: devolution
is in; hierarchy is out. Similarly, the staff-heavy, policy-analytic bu-
reaus that were the legacy of the 1960s and 1970s are now viewed as
bloated at best, dysfunctional on average.I4 Management theory has
taken a new tack, and Al Gore has become the guru of governmental
reengineering, the primary publicist for the new management paradigm
of lean, flat, "customer-driven" public organizations.IIi
The Vice President's first National Performance Review ("NPR
I") began with a report issued in September 1993 that promised noth-
ing less than a revolutionary reshaping of the federal government.IS
Streamlining, downsizing, and the empowering of line officials were the
watchwords of the NPR's proposals. The NPR thus borrowed directly
from the contemporary "customer-centered" and "empowerment-ori-
ented" managerial philosophies that have spread rapidly throughout
the private sector.
The 1993 NPR also promised $108 billion in savings.I7 A substan-
tial part of that savings was to come from eliminating jobs for approxi-
11. PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, supra note 3, merely con-
demned the independent regulatory agency. The President provoked a mini-constitutional crisis by
removing a member of the Federal Trade Commission while steadfastly refusing to give any
"cause" for the removal as required by the Federal Trade Commission Act. See Humphrey's
Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
12. FREDERICK W. TAYLOR, THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT (1911).
13. For an overview of evolving theories and fashions in the understanding and management
of bureaucracies, see CHARLES PERROW, COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS: A CRITICAL EssAY (3d ed.
1986).
14. For the immediate intellectual origins of the National Performance Review, see DAVID
OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: How THE ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS
TRANSFORMING THE PUBUC SECTOR (1992). The book is a mixture of free market economics (the
ubiquitous call for privatization) and the most popular of the current business motivational litera-
ture. As is common in such discussions, everything boils down to ten principles for entrepreneurial
government that if fully implemented will transform governmental effectiveness.
15. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
16. See NPR I, supra note 10.
17. See id. at 222.
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mately one-quarter-million government employees.IS With the Federal
Workforce Restructuring Act of 1994/9 Congress quickly signed on to
the downsizing goals outlined in the NPR. Indeed, the Act upped the
NPR's ante by some twenty thousand employees. The NPR movement
thus seemed to have interbranch appeal, to the extent that its proposals
were consistent with the politics of deficit reduction.
But much of NPR I had little to do with simple cost savings. The
Report urges downsizing from a particular perspective. Government
bureaus are to be reconfigured to give better service by empowering
line personnel to respond to "customer" demands.20 "Empowerment"
here is essentially a form of internal deregulation. By executive order,
President Clinton directed all agencies to jettison at least fifty percent
of their internal "red tape."21 Thus, many of the jobs to be eliminated
are those of middle managers who developed and oversaw agency sys-
tems and processes, audited compliance with internal agency policies,
and evaluated personnel. They will not be needed once the regulations
that they developed and policed-the "red tape" presumably strangling
the line bureaucracy-have been discarded.
The streamlining process is to be overseen by a COO in each
agency who is responsible to ensure that the bureau is, indeed, reen-
gineered in the new mold.22 Each COO is also a member of the new
President's Management Council, which functions as a central
clearinghouse for developing and propagating managerial improve-
ments to implement the vision of NPR 1.23
Should anyone doubt at least the rhetorical reality of this new
managerialist movement, she should spend a few days in almost any
public office "inside the beltway." For two years, "reengineering
teams" have been churning out mountains of proposals for "reinvent-
ing" their bureaus to produce better "service" to "customers" at less
cost. Presumably the better reinventors will not be among the 272,900
18. ld.
19. Pub. L. No. 103-226, 108 Stat. HI (1994).
20. See NPR I, supra note 10, at 65-91.
21. Exec. Order No. 12,861, 58 Fed. Reg. 48,255 (1993). For an extensive discussion of the
basic clash between ideas of public administration grounded in notions of public law and public
administration as an exercise in entrepreneurial management, see Robert C. Moe & Robert S.
Gilmour, Rediscovering Principles ofPublic Administration: The Neglected Foundations ofPub-
lic Law, 55 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 135 (1995).
22. See NPR I, supra note 10, at 89.
23. ld. at 89-90.
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managers who are to disappear from the public service between fiscal
years 1994 and 1999.
III. SOME REALISM ABOUT MANAGERIALISM
It is difficult, indeed impossible, to oppose the broad goals of NPR
I. Better government service at lower cost is not controversial. The
problem is that these ambitious ideas concerning cutting "red tape,"
focusing on customers first, empowering employees, and getting back to
basics seem to miss the point of the activities of most federal public
agencies. In some areas, such as procurement, the activities of the fed-
eral government are similar to private enterprise. The primary goals of
quality and cost-effectiveness are clear, and it is possible to identify
who the customers are and what they want. Yet even here there are
significant differences. Governments have always used procurement
policy to further additional social goals-goals that suggest attention to
different "customers." And, of course, public tolerance for any form of
"corruption" is much lower when public funds are being spent. Much
administrative "red tape" is an attempt to pursue complex, multiple
objectives while guarding against the misuse of public money. Surely
some "red tape" is just that. But do slogans like "customer driven,"
"empowerment," or the like tell us anything about what is expendable?
In other areas, application of these managerial concepts is even
less obvious. When giving out Social Security disability benefits, for
example, are the customers the claimants, the general working public
that pays FICA taxes to support the program, or the public that politi-
cally supports the program? Surely "all of the above" is correct. These
"customers," however, have differing interests. Whose demands are to
be met? In making benefits determinations, at what point do proce-
dural due process and administrative safeguards which ensure the in-
tegrity of the program become "red tape" that should be jettisoned in
the interest of quicker service? And, if the "basics" of benefits adjudi-
cation are captured in goals such as "accuracy, fairness and timeli-
ness," the difficult managerial problem lies in mediating the tension
amongst those goals in the concrete operation of the program. How a
"flat, lean, customer-driven" organization helps accomplish this feat re-
mains mysterious.
To put the matter slightly differently, it is not clear that NPR I
has understood the lessons of virtually all public management research
since the Progressive Era's embrace of "rational democracy" domi-
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nated by professional elites.24 NPR I argues that its recommendations
are focused primarily on how government should work, not on what it
should do.211 But, if scholars and practitioners of public administration
know anything, it is that this distinction is both artificial and mislead-
ing. The how of government operation powerfully shapes the what, be-
cause means embody ends. It is impossible to think seriously about how
a program is to be run unless that thinking is driven by a sophisticated
understanding of the what that is the object of government action.
Radically transforming the how has major impacts on the what.
Return for a moment to the disability benefits example. The front
line troops in this activity are disability examiners. Their most direct
"customers" are claimants for disability benefits. There seems little
reason for either the customers or the "front line" examiners to be sat-
isfied with current arrangements. The customers must now wait nine
months on average for a decision on a claim, eighteen months to two
years if they have to appeal, and fewer than half receive what they
imagined would be a secure entitlement. Meanwhile, the examiners are
awash in regulations and manual instructions and are continuously
monitored by "middle managers"-supervisors, quality assurance per-
sonnel and administrative law judges.26 From the NPR I perspective,
this system looks ripe for "reinvention." Indeed, it is being reen-
gineered as we speak. But what direction should that reengineering
take?
While the simplest solution would be to hire more examiners, this
is ruled out by NPR 1's dedication to trim personnel. Other possible
approaches range from the silly to the grotesque. Make the customers
happy by paying all claims? Speed up the decisions by throwing out the
medical, vocational, and evidentiary criteria and flipping coins? Em-
power the line personnel by eliminating the rules, supervision, and
quality assurance systems that seek to assure that the examiners' deci-
sions are accurate or consistent? Tell disappointed claimants (sorry,
"customers") that the appeals process has been dismantled because it
disempowered front line personnel and made no clear contribution to
swift and accurate processing of claims? Make it easier and quicker to
24. For a more extended version of this argument, see David H. Rosenbloom, Have an
Administrative Prescription? Don't Forget the Politics!, 53 PuB. ADMIN. REv. 503 (1993).
25. See NPR I, supra note 10, at 2.
26. See generally JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECUR-
ITY DISABILITY CLAIMS (l983).
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appeal because the "customers" like appeals, whatever their value in
reaching proper determinations?
This burlesque of the reengineering processes' options is not meant
to suggest that disability adjudication cannot be improved. I have ar-
gued for years that it can and should be.27 The point rather is that
management babble about customers, flat organizations, and cutting
"red tape" gives us very little purchase on what useful reform might
look like. That purchase is lacking because the managerialist perspec-
tive it provides fails to understand that here, as elsewhere in govern-
ment, the process is the product. Deciding who meets the eligibility
criteria for disability payments is an interpretive enterprise whose qual-
ity and legitimacy must be evaluated more by the inputs-substantive
standards, evidentiary rules, fact-gathering routines, justification re-
quirements, quality checks, and appeal rights-than by the outputs.
There is no objective, external referent for determining whether a
claimant, given her health, age, education, and prior work experience,
can do any job in the national economy paying at least $500 per
month. Hence, to change the process of decision, to "reengineer" it, is
to change the product as well-to rearrange, subtly or dramatically,
the complex and cross-cutting purposes that underlie the scheme of dis-
ability insurance. Changing the rules and processes changes what is
being done, not just how the government does it.
To be scrupulously fair, the second National Performance Review
("NPR 11")28 does take up the "what" question by proposing the elimi-
nation, consolidation or "out sourcing" of a number of existing tasks.
These proposals, however, do not really address the problem that I am
discussing. NPR I's failure to recognize that the managerial cannot be
separated from the political and that methods of implementation ulti-
mately determine the substance of policy is not repaired-or even ame-
liorated - by NPR II's focus on "what" rather than "how."
To return to the more general point, talk about doing better for
less fundamentally misunderstands the purpose of most federal admin-
istrative activity. To be sure, there is some relatively straightforward
service delivery at the federal level-defense and the administration of
public lands 100m large in this regard. The postal service and Amtrak
do, as well, although both have been already partially "privatized." But
most federal agencies develop general norms and adjudicate cases.
27. See. e.g., id. at 28 (arguing that a less legalistic and more interdisciplinary adjudicatory
process be employed).
28. See NPR II, supra note 10.
HeinOnline -- 57 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 413 1995-1996
1996] REINVENTING GOVERNMENT 413
They are in the governance business, not the service provision business.
Their purpose is to pursue the common good, not to cater to the prefer-
ences of individual customers.
This category mistake-confusing citizens with customers-has
major political and legal consequences. So conceived, NPR I has a re-
form agenda that conflicts with some central understandings about the
political and legal control of administrative governance in the United
States. On the political side, for example, NPR I seems committed to a
"Greyhound theory" of congressional legislation and oversight. "Just
tell us the destination and leave the driving to the front line administra-
tors," seems to be the message to Congress. Indeed, it is hard to see
how moving authority down the hierarchy could fail to lessen congres-
sional control of public policy. It threatens to create a dispersed army
of "empowered" public entrepreneurs who answer to "customers" as
defined by their own understandings of the programs they administer.
This is unlikely to be supported by a Congress already concerned about
its ability to oversee the federal administrative establishment.29
There is much to be said for reducing congressional micromanage-
ment of many programs. But not all, perhaps few, programs can be
restructured to pursue objectively determinable goals that would permit
radical bureaucratic devolution without loss of political accountability.
To return to the prior example, I have no idea how to specify an objec-
tive output for the disability benefits program. Congress could demand
that all claims be processed within thirty days, that thirty-five percent
of applicants receive pensions and that the program support no more
than 5.2 persons per 1,000 covered workers at anyone time. Success or
failure could then be measured no matter what the internal organiza-
tion or processes of the Social Security Administration or what criteria
of judgment were used by its examiners. But, if Congress took this ap-
proach, it would not have the foggiest notion of whether these objec-
tives were in pursuit of sensible social insurance policies, or even
whether they were consistent with each other.
Similarly, Congress could instruct health and safety agencies to
save X number of lives and prevent Y number of serious illnesses or
accidents per year while expending no more than Z dollars of public
and private monies. But, even if such instructions were politically via-
ble, they are operationally fraudulent. Only the most irresponsibly opti-
29. The lack of an explicit strategy to deal with Congress is one of the primary criticisms of
the reinventing government effort. See DONALD F. KEn"L, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT?: AP-
PRAISING TIlE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW (1994).
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mistic social scientist would assert that anyone could come close to
measuring whether a particular agency had either reached its public
health and safety goals or remained within its cost constraints. Ac-
countability would be a scientistic myth.so
Hence, most of the time, Congress must specify purposes, criteria,
powers, and processes in its enabling legislation, rather than simply ob-
jective goals. This legislative format presumes that administrators will
be held accountable in part for inputs-subsidiary rules, procedures,
supervisory controls, and the like- because outputs will be poorly speci-
fied and/or difficult to measure. Political accountability thus entails ex-
planation and oversight concerning the reasonableness of substantive
decisions, the procedural fairness of decisionmaking, and the informal
controls established to assure both. Congressional inquiries to the Sec-
retary of Health and Human Services or the Environmental Protection
Agency administrators about the reasonableness or fairness of agency
actions can hardly be answered by the suggestion that front line offi-
cials now have authority to use their best judgment and Congress
should talk to them. Political accountability seems to demand precisely
the internal systems, middle management supervisors and planners, and
documentation ("red tape") that NPR I seeks to abolish.
Finally, and most importantly for this discussion, it is possible that
the enthusiasm for managerial reinvention has obscured the ways in
which radical decentralization affects legal, as well as political, control.
The long-term commitment of American administrative law has been
to assure that administrative discretion is structured, checked, and bal-
anced. Administrative efficacy must be weighed against demands for
liberty and legality, as well as political accountability.
When pursuing this project, American administrative law tends to
presuppose clear lines of authority, hierarchical control, and responsi-
bility focused on the top level management of agencies. For example,
lawsuits claiming an improper denial of Social Security disability bene-
fits are nominally against the Secretary of Health and Human Services.
Is it to be a defense in such a proceeding for the Secretary to point out
that, in the process of agency reinvention, authority to make disability
decisions has been devolved to lower levels of administration that are
now effectively outside of her control? Are lower level bureaucrats to
be made individually responsible in damages for errors in administra-
30. For an analysis of the difficulties of estimating the effects of health and safety regula-
tion in one particular program, see JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST. THE STRUGGLE FOR
AUTO SAFETY (I 990).
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tion? Or is the project of legal control that has preoccupied American
lawyers for 200 years to be abandoned in pursuit of faster ~ervice
delivery?
While these questions may seem fanciful, they suggest the logical
implications of NPR I's management philosophy. We really cannot
have the cake of dispersed administrative discretion and ingest signifi-
cant legal control of it as well. No one made this point, while coming
down repeatedly on the side of extending the reach of legal controls, as
tirelessly as Kenneth Culp Davis.31 Davis may have overdone it, but by
and large American administrative law has followed suit-even in pro-
grams devoted primarily to service delivery.32 After all our canonical
text on presumptive judicial review, the Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park v. Vo/pe33 decision involves highway construqtion by an agency
that had sought assiduously to satisfy its major customers.34
The simple fact of the matter is that legal control is wonderfully
bureaucratizing. Nothing focuses an administrator's mind more keenly
on record keeping, turning square procedural corners, elaborate justifi-
catory analysis, and a host of other red-tape-producing activities than
the prospect of judicial review. Indeed many administrative law schol-
ars, myself included, have laid the underperformance of a host of fed-
eral agencies squarely at the door of excessive, intrusive, or ill-timed
judicial review.35
The point is plain enough: NPR I's basic managerial presupposi-
tions are on a collision course with administrative law's contemporary
understanding of legality in administration. Although no mention of
these matters can be found in the Vice President's manifesto, he has
implicitly demanded a major rethinking of the structure of the legal
control of administration. For without such a change, it seems impossi-
ble to imagine how the reengineering effort can succeed.
31. See. e.g., KENNETH C. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 188-
214 (1969) (arguing for much closer legal control of prosecutorial discretion).
32. See Peter L. Strauss, Revisiting Overton Park: Political and Judicial Controls Over
Administrative Actions Affecting the Community, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1251, 1252-54 (1992).
33. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
34. For an extended discussion of the political context of the Overton Park litigation, see
generally Strauss, supra note 32.
35. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Improving the Environment of Agency Rulemaking: An
Essay on Management, Games and Accountability, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185 (l994).
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IV. ENSURING REGULATORY RIGOR MORTIS: CONGRESS PURSUES
REGULATORY REFORM
While the implications of Vice President Gore's proposals for
reinventing government are deeply antithetical to the control of discre-
tion by law, current regulatory reform proposals in Congress head in
precisely the opposite direction. Seizing on administrative law's capac-
ity to incapacitate administration, Congress is proposing to impose ad-
ditional layers of legal constraint on bureaucracies that are now strug-
gling to meet minimal performance expectations.36
The use of procedure to put administrators out of business is
hardly novel in American administrative law. One of my personal fa-
vorites is the Fulbright Amendment to the Walsh-Healey Public Con-
tracts Act.37 Superbly representing the interests of Arkansas employ-
ers, the second lowest wage state in the Union at the time,3S Senator
Fulbright managed to impose trial-type proceedings on rulemaking by
the Labor Department whenever it sought to establish the prevailing
wage rates for purposes of federal contracting.39 The Walsh-Healey
program collapsed under the procedural weight of this adversarial
mode of administration.40
But Senator Fulbright's piecemeal approach is legislatively bur-
densome.41 The activities of the administrative state can be crippled
much more effectively by general provisions applicable to most regula-
tory activities. Moreover, the more general the requirement, the less it
36. See Benenson. supra note I, at 2159-62.
37. For further illustration of how formal process affects the prevailing wage rate determi-
nation under the Walsh-Healey Act, see Wirtz v. Baldor Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 518 (D.C. Cir.
1963).
38. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1370-4, EMPLOYMENT
AND EARNINGS STATISTICS FOR STATES AND AREAS, 1939-66, at !xi tbI. 18 (1967).
39. See Walsh-Healey Act, Pub. L. No. 429, § 301, 55 Stat. 308 (1952) (codified as
amended at 41 U.S.C.A. § 43a (West 1987 & Supp. 1995».
40. See Robert W. Hamilton, Procedures for the Adoption ofRules ofGeneral Applicabil-
ity: The Need for Procedural Innovation and Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CAL. L. REV. 1276,
1305 (1972).
41. Requirements for formal rulemaking appear in several regulatory statutes enacted prior
to the Administrative Procedure Act including the Walsh-Healey Act, certain laws administered
by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (for cer-
tain categories of rules). ld. at 1279-80. A handful of post-1946 laws, such as the Fair Packaging
and Labeling Act and the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 require trial type proceed-
ings for the adoption of rules. ld. The great majority of federal statutes, however, are silent on the
matter, thus incorporating the requirements of APA § 553, or else prescribe less formal rule-
making procedures. ld. at 1313-30. Few have had a good word to say for formal rule-making
processes. For a general discussion, see id.
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looks like simple obstructionism rather than reform in the interests of
fairness and rationality. Indeed, while presidents emphasize administra-
tive efficacy in their reform efforts, congressional legislation on admin-
istrative process, from the 19th century judicialization of the Interstate
Commerce Commission to most contemporary reform proposals,
marches under banners proclaiming procedural fairness, open govern-
ment, and legal accountability.
Prior Congresses have hardly been pikers when it comes to impos-
ing generalized procedural or analytic requirements on agency decision-
making. The National Environmental Policy Act of 196942 ("NEPA"),
the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980,43 the Regulatory Flexibility
Act," indeed the Administrative Procedure Act45 ("APA") itself, all
impose information-gathering and analysis requirements on federal
agencies. Only the first and the last, however, permitted judicial review
of compliance. Moreover, NEPA demands only procedural compliance,
while the APA's vague commands have been left to be elaborated al-
most exclusively by judicial interpretation.
To be sure, many commentators find existing analytic require-
ments, whether or not backed by judicial review, sufficient to disable
many regulatory agencies.46 But, that is apparently not sufficient proce-
dural protection for contemporary "regulatory reformers."
The current Congress led off with what some have called a
"stealth" regulatory reform bill:47 Title II of the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act of 1995.48 That title codifies many of the analytic require-
ments that were contained in presidential executive orders from Carter
through Clinton. The statute, however, makes a number of these re-
quirements considerably more burdensome. In particular, it requires
coordination and consultation with state, local, or tribal governments
which might be affected by regulation and the inclusion of a summary
of their comments in the rationale for any proposed or final rule.49 In
addition, the agency must identify and consider a reasonable number of
42. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988).
43. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501·3520 (1988).
44. 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (1994).
45. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1994).
46. See Mashaw, supra note 35, at 190-93.
47. William Funk, Report Card on Regulatory Reform, 20 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS No.4,
Summer 1995, at l.
48. 2 U.S.C.A. § 1531 (West 1995).
49. ld. § 1533.
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regulatory alternatives and "select the least costly, most cost-effective
or least burdensome alternative."IIO
While Title II requires that agencies report their compliance with
its mandates to the Congress and to the Office of Management and
Budget ("OMB"),1I1 Title IV of the Act provides for judicial review of
compliance.1I2 Judicial review is limited to the procedural requirements
of the Act and does not seem to contemplate review of the agency's
substantive analysis of costs, benefits, or alternatives. However, the
APA does contemplate substantive review of anything included in the
rule-making record. And, contemporary proposals to amend the APA
would, as we shall see below, add considerable legal leverage to these
analytic demands.
Yet more analytic requirements were appended to the reauthoriza-
tion of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 in its amendments. lls
Moreover, those amendments overruled Dole v. United Steelworkers of
America,1I4 thus requiring that agencies receive OMB authorization to
impose any information requirement, even when it is for the purpose of
giving information to persons outside of the government. In short, the
OMB is now authorized to second guess any agency's decision to use
information as a regulatory technique.
Further regulatory reform is contemplated by the congressional
leadership. The flavor of current thinking is exemplified by the "discus-
sion draft" version of a bill introduced into the Congressional Record
by Senator Dole and is based on his prior "Comprehensive Regulatory
Reform Act of 1995" (section 343).1111 Although the formal version of
these proposals was stalled by a Democratic filibuster that narrowly
survived a cloture vote,1I6 the Dole Bill suggests the thinking of the Re-
publican majority and is the likely platform on which further efforts at
regulatory reform will be built.
The Dole Bill would amend section 553 of the APA to make "in-
formal" rulemaking procedure considerably more onerous.1I7 Among
other things, it elaborates the material that must be in proposed and
final rules, including a demand for the solicitation and consideration of
50. [d. § 1535(a).
51. [d. § 1535.
52. [d. § 1571.
53. Pub. L. No. 104-13, 109 Stat. 163 (to be codified at 44 U.S.C. ch. 35).
54. 494 U.S. 26 (1990).
55. 141 CONGo REC. S8793-95 (daily ed. June 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole).
56. Benenson, supra note 1, at 2159.
57. 141 CONGo REC. S8795-96 (daily ed. June 21, 1995).
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alternative proposals from persons outside the agency in order to
achieve the objectives of the rulemaking process in a less burdensome
manner.liB Agencies must respond to these and all other comments on
the proposed rule and explain how the "factual conclusions upon which
the rule is based are substantially supported in the rule-making file."1I9
A number of the exceptions to the requirements of informal rule-mak-
ing in section 553 are eliminated.60
Section 706 is also amended to add a new basis for holding unlaw-
ful and setting aside agency action; that is, when a rule is "without
substantial support in the rulemaking file, viewed as a whole, for the
asserted or necessary factual basis, in the case of a rule adopted in a
proceeding subject to Section 553."61 These requirements come very
close to imposing on all agencies the peculiar rulemaking process that
is credited with putting the Consumer Product Safety Commission out
of the rule-making business.62
But the Dole proposals go even further. They require an extensive
risk characterization and risk assessment process for all major rules
that regulate health, safety, or the environment.63 They would mandate
cost/benefit analysis for all major regulations and require review of all
existing regulations using this same analytic technique.54 With some
exceptions, agencies are mandated to adopt the most cost-effective rule
available.611 Any cost/benefit or risk assessment analysis must be sum-
marized in the file of the rule-making proceeding and becomes a part
of the factual basis subject to review by the judiciary.66 And, lest agen-
cies fail to perform their required functions under the Regulatory Flex-
ibility Act, the procedural and analytic requirements of that act are
subjected to judicial review as well. Truth in packaging would require
that this bill be titled "The Administrative Gridlock, and Lawyers and
Economists Relief Act of 1995."
58. [d.
59. [d.
60. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994).
61. 141 CONGo REC. S8803 (daily ed. June 21, 1995).
62. For a discussion of the Consumer Product Safety Commission's innovative and disas-
trous rule-making process, see Terrence M. Scanlon & Robert A. Rogowsky, Back-Door
Rulemaking: A View From the CPSC, REGULATION, July/August 1984, at 27; Teresa M.
Schwartz, The Consumer Product Safety Commission: A Flawed Product ofa Consumer Decade,
51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 32 (1982).
63. 141 CONGo REC. S8800 (daily ed. June 21, 1995).
64. [d. at S8800-01.
65. [d. at S8802.
66. [d.
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There are many details and nuances to the Dole proposals, and
they seem unlikely to pass without amendment. The basic idea, how-
ever, is not hard to grasp. While arguably reinforcing the accountabil-
ity, reasonableness, and procedural fairness of administrative policy-
making, these "regulatory reform" proposals are designed to stall and
derail many rule-making efforts. They take some of the unfortunate
tendencies of contemporary American administrative law to their logi-
cal conclusions. A legal regime that critics like Robert Kagan have
characterized as exalting "adversariallegalism" over effective adminis-
tration is opened up to yet further legal wrangling.67 If something re-
sembling these "reforms" is passed, administrative legality will be in no
danger, but effective administrative governance may warrant listing in
the catalogue of endangered species. Put in terms of the history of the
development of American administrative law, we might say that Con-
gress will have finally overridden President Roosevelt's veto of the Wal-
ter Logan Act. Proceduralism backed by judicial review will have tri-
umphed over the administrative state.
On the other hand, this use of law to defeat law-making may ulti-
mately undermine administrative law itself. Two alternative scenarios
seem plausible. If the programs that are crippled by these "re-
forms"-importantly the health and safety programs that must regu-
late by rules-retain substantial public support, then legal technicality
will eventually come to be seen as the enemy of effective governance.
And, in some future counterreformation, process fairness and rational-
ity review may well be ignored in the interest of regulatory efficacy. In
some new New Deal, administration will triumph over law.
Alternatively, the new hyperlegalism may remain, but be honored
mostly in the breach.6S Many agencies can avoid using the regulatory
techniques that are to be "reformed." Agencies such as the Food and
Drug Administration, the Federal Communications Commission, or the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, with broad licensing, certifi-
cation or rule-making authority can control whole industries without
ever issuing a single regulation. The Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion and the banking regulatory agencies can probably be equally effec-
67. Robert A. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism and American Government, 10 J. POL'y ANAL-
YSIS & MGMT. 369 (1991).
68. Commentators report that this process is already well under way. See general1y Michael
Asimow, Non-Legislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, 1985 DUKE L.J. 381; Robert A.
Anthony, "Wel1, You Want the Permit. Don't You?": Agency Efforts to Make Nonlegislative
Documents Bind the Public, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 31 (1992).
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tive through threats of prosecution, even raised eyebrows. The losses
then will be in the form of openness, consistency, and, perhaps, ration-
ality-precisely the values that administrative law has sought to pro-
tect. Discretion will be exercised, but it will be informal and hidden
because the processes of formal action have become too legalistic to be
utilized.
v. CONCLUSION
Readers of the preceding pages will certainly have noticed that the
executive and legislative branches of the federal government have re-
markably different ideas about what is needed to make administrative
governance more responsive to the will of the people. The executive
exalts efficacy seemingly heedless of its effect on legality. The Congress
exalts legality precisely to destroy efficacy. That the two institutions
are at cross purposes is not surprising. As I noted earlier, this results
not only from partisan ideological differences, but because of a long-
standing institutional competition built into our constitutional
structure.
An optimistic vision of the separation of powers might suggest that
this competition will end in a compromise: the ultimate resolution will
be some moderate but consequential system of legal control that never-
theless permits effective governance.
But this optimistic vision may well be naive. The current executive
neglect and congressional abuse of administrative law seem to have a
negative form of synergy. Apparently agreeing only that government
should be smaller, the combined activities of these political branches
seem designed to ensure even higher levels of incompetence and illegal-
ity. Congress is bent on adding "red tape" at least as fast as the execu-
tive proposes to eliminate it. Moreover, the new "red tape" is backed
by enforceable legal demands for compliance. But, with a radically
downsized labor force, particularly in the staff positions necessary to
meet the new regulatory reform requirements, agencies are unlikely to
be able to act either effectively or legally.
Administrative law has always seemed to walk a fine line between
impertinence and irrelevance. Impertinence because it risked delaying,
deflecting, or derailing needed public action. Irrelevance because not-
withstanding its claims to ensure legality, administrative discretion re-
mained ubiquitous. Striking the proper balance between legality and
efficacy has never been easy. It has motivated administrative law's con-
stant reform efforts over at least the last six decades. While arguably
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within that continuing reform tradition, current movements in Con-
gress and the Executive Branch do not, in my judgment, promise much
assistance in the serious task of ensuring effective governance under
law.
HeinOnline -- 57 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 423 1995-1996





II. Technology and Government Accountability. . . . . . . . . .. 424
A. Accountability Through Openness in Government. 426
B. Accountability Through Direct Democracy . . . . . .. 428
C. Accountability Through Devolution. . . . . . . . . . . . .. 430
III. Accountability and the Administrative State . . . . . . . . .. 434
A. The Standard Paradigm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 434
B. Emerging Issues in Administrative Law. . . . . . . . .. 437
1. Issues of Preemption 438
2. Private/Public Cooperation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 439
3. The Administrative Procedure of Privatization 439
IV. Conclusion....................................... 441
I. INTRODUCTION
In his exhaustive study, Oriental Despotism, Karl Wittfogel con-
cludes that the need for "large-scale and government-managed works
of irrigation and flood control" was the reason for the totalitarian
structure of many ancient and medieval eastern societies.l Put other-
wise, centralized state control was needed in order to organize, run, and
protect large-scale government public works projects. This notion of
"Asiatic despotism" was viewed by Marx as an exception to his laws of
economic development.2 Under "Asiatic despotism" it is the technologi-
cal imperative, rather than the economic "mode of production," that
• Visiting Professor of Law, Columbus School of Law, Catholic University of America. The
speech on which this essay is based was given when I was a Senior Fellow at the Heritage Foun-
dation, Washington, D.C., which provided an extraordinary intellectual environment within which
to think on matters of government regulation.
1. KARL WITIFOGEL, ORIENTAL DESPOTISM 3 (1995).
2. Karl Marx, The British Rule in India, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., July 25, 1853, in 12 KARL
MARX & FREDERICK ENGELS: COLLECTED WORKS 125 (Progress Publishers, Moscow 1979).
423
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determines the structure of society and need for a strong, overbearing
state.s
The notion that technology necessitates bureaucracy and that bu-
reaucracy would inevitably lead to an overreaching state was a popular
one in the "short" twentieth century-the years from the outbreak of
the First World War to the collapse of the USSR.4 Modern (meaning
before the fall of the Berlin wall) Marxist scholars recognized the dan-
gers inherent in what some termed the bureaucratisation du monde.6
Liberals prophesied that a knowledge-based elite, be they scientists or
engineers, were taking over.6 Conservatives bewailed the advent of
"The Technological Society" with its concomitant loss of faith.7 Many
have accepted the inevitability of continued bureaucratic centralization,
as evidenced by the title of a recent law review article: The Rise and
Rise of the Administrative State.s
In this short paper I hope to point out two aspects of twenty-first
century political life that relate to the challenge of ensuring govern-
ment accountability. The first point relates to how advances in com-
puter and media technology increase the potential of government ac-
countability and how these technological developments will increase
implementation of the principle of subsidiarity, or, in the American
context, devolution of political power to state and local governments.
Second, I will address the impact of these developments on administra-
tive law in the next century.
II. TECHNOLOGY AND GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
Recently both futurists and students of democracy have begun to
3. Id.; see also MARIAN SAWER. MARXISM AND THE QUESTION OF THE AsIATIC MODE OF
PRODUCTION 41-46 (1977) (highlighting Marx's belief that Asian society's lack of private prop-
erty ownership stems from the reliance on the government for "providing public works," including
irrigation).
4. I borrow the term from ERIC HOBSBAWM. THE AGE OF EXTREMES: THE SHORT TWENTI-
ETH CENTURY 1914-1991 (1994).
5. See BRUNO RizZO. LA BUREAUCRATISATION DU MONDE (l939). Part I of this book was
translated as THE BUREAUCRATIZATION OF THE WORLD (Adam Westoby trans., The Free Press
1985).
6. See. e.g., JOHN K. GALBRAITH. THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 282-95 (1967) (discussing
the educational and scientific establishment); Daniel Bell, Notes on the Post-Industrial Society
(I), PUB. INTEREST, Winter 1967, at 24, 27-28; Zbigniew Brzezinski, America in the Technetronic
Age, ENCOUNTER, Jan. 1968, at 16.
7. See JACQUES ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY (John Wilkinson trans., 1964)
(1954).
8. Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARY. L. REV. 1231
(l994).
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think about technological determinism in radically different terms. No
longer does technological advance assume a more bureaucratic central-
ized society. Thus in The Electronic Republic, Larry Grossman has
argued that:
This is the first generation of citizens who can see, hear, and judge their own
political leaders simultaneously and instantaneously. It is also the first generation
of political leaders who can address the entire population and receive instant
feedback about what the people think and want. Interactive telecommunications
increasingly give ordinary citizens immediate access to the major political deci-
sions that affect their lives and property.9
This means that technology can be used to make governments more
accountable. The very same technology that is feared by technolud-
dites10 and is the cause, so Marxists say, of "Asiatic despotism" also
contains the potential for the kind of devolved (and involved) demos
that conservatives support as well. Now, scholars like Michael Fitts
suggest that too much knowledge can be bad for democracy.ll I incline,
however, to the opposing view that increased information availability
may in fact "reconnect" American voters to the political process and
help solve this country's problems with low voter turnout.12 Regardless
of one's views regarding the appropriate level of information availabil-
ity, the emerging electronic republic, however, "brings enormous politi-
cal leverage to ordinary citizens."13 In this regard, technology empow-
ers citizens by providing them with a playing field in which they can
compete with professional lobbyists and politicians.
9. LAWRENCE K. GROSSMAN, THE ELECTRONIC REPUBLIC 4 (1995).
10. See, e.g., KIRKPATRICK SALE, REBELS AGAINST THE FUTURE: LESSONS FOR THE COM-
PUTER AGE (arguing that "a world by the technologies of the industrial society is more detrimen-
tal than beneficial to human happiness and survival"); see also Michael Pellechia, A Fascinating
Look at Folks Rebelling Against the Future, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), June 9, 1995, at 2 (com-
paring Sale with the Luddites of the Industrial Revolution).
11. See Michael A. Fitts, Can Ignorance Be Bliss? Imperfect Information as a Positive
Influence in Political Institutions, 88 MICH. L. REV. 917, 920 (1990) (contrasting Fitts's argu-
ment with the traditional economic ideal of perfect information). This approach reminds one of
the political scientists of the 1950s who argued that low voting rates reflect a healthy democracy
in that people are not so unhappy that they feel compelled to vote. See TOM DELuCA, THE Two
FACES OF POLITICAL APATHY 78 (1995).
12. See RUY A. TEIXEIRA, THE DISAPPEARING AMERICAN VOTER 154-58 (1992). This study
of voting behavior suggests that a core cause of low turnout rates in American elections is that
voters are not motivated. See id. at 57. One solution the author proposes is to make the voter feel
more a part of the political process. See id. at 148-51. This could be done through the greater
availability of information. See id. at 158-62.
13. GROSSMAN, supra note 9, at 147.
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A. Accountability Through Openness in Government
One distinctly American approach to ensuring government ac-
countability has been a bias towards openness in government. This is
best expressed through the Freedom of Information Act principle that,
absent specific statutory exemptions, one should presume a general
right of access to government documents.14 This bias towards openness
recognizes Max Weber's insight that secrecy is a way that bureaucratic
elites maintain both legitimacy and power.1G Open government is the
way for citizens to control this "sociology of domination."16
There can be no doubt that the task of maintaining openness in
government becomes far easier in the computer age. For one, twenty-
first century technology makes government disclosure easier and more
efficient. Given that computer tapes are clearly "documents" under the
Freedom of Information Act,l7 the possibility of widening the ambit of
government disclosure inexpensively becomes a real possibility.
Further, given the present state of computer technology, as elec-
tronic filing predominates, such document requests become simple
tasks. Not only does ease of access improve-so does the quality of the
information accessed. Today, if asked for file references on Jones, a
government agency is likely to produce the file on Jones (and specific
cross-references) rather than all the instances in which references to
Jones appear in a database regardless of file title. This is understanda-
ble, as the manpower required to cross-check files in any systematic
way would be inordinate. But with existing information retrieval tech-
nologies, such reference checks become simple tasks, as the subjects of
Nexis database searches often learn to their discomfort. It is now possi-
ble to use hypertext to link files and documents that would otherwise
take much more time to search and retrieve.
At the same time, technology makes it simpler for citizens around
14. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (mandating that federal agencies make certain information availa-
ble to the public unless protected by a specific exemption); Cuneo v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1086
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that FOIA creates a liberal disclosure requirement, and that exemp-
tions are to be construed narrowly). Sweden apparently has this general right of access as well.
See Peter Seipel, The Technology ofInsight: Computers and Informed Citizens, 69 Cm.-KENT L.
REV. 417, 418-19 (1993).
15. DIRK KASLER, MAX WEBER: AN INTRODUCTION To HIS LIFE AND WORK 161-68
(1988) (discussing Weber's theory of the "sociology of domination").
16. /d.
17. Long v. IRS, 596 F.2d 362, 365 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that "FOIA applies to com-
puter tapes to the same extent it applies to any other documents"), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 917
(1980).
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the country to be aware of agency regulations and to participate in
agency rulemakings. Henry Perritt argues that information technology
can be a tremendous help to the administrative state.IS Devices such as
electronic bulletin boards and e-mail could facilitate the peaceful reso-
lution of disputes in either the adjudicative or rule-making context.19
The standard argument, of course, is that participation in agency
rulemaking (as an example) is limited to those interest groups who can
afford to participate in "inside the Beltway" games with lobbyists and
lawyers. Ordinary citizens, it has been argued, cannot compete and in
many instances do not even know about regulatory issues until they
have been resolved one way or another. The classic liberal response, of
course, is that public interest lawyers are the citizens' paladins; they
read the Federal Register daily and act as citizen-surrogates. One of
the reasons behind passage of the citizen-intervenor sections of the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act20 in the 1970s was the perceived need
for local public interest lawyers to be paid to come to Washington to
represent local interests in FTC rulemakings.21
Technology, however, may well make that approach obsolete.
Modems and CD-ROMs make the Federal Register available in Boise,
Idaho and Butte, Montana. Lexis and Westlaw make agency regula-
tions and precedents available as well. Indeed, some agencies like the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission have begun to use electronic filing as
a primary tool in certain regulatory proceedings.22
The SEC, for instance, uses a system which requires corporations
to file several required documents electronically.23 Taxpayers are also
able to file returns electronically with the IRS.24 These are just exam-
ples of what is possible for filing periodic reports required by any num-
ber of agencies. This electronic filing not only benefits the reporting
18. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., President Clinton's Information Infrastructure Initiative: Com-
munity Regained?, 69 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 991, 1011-13 (1994).
19. See id. at 1012.
20. Magnuson-Moss Warranty- Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 57a (1988)). Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975).
21. See S. CONF. REp. No. 1408, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7755, 7768 (considering the payment of counsel to represent interests which would
otherwise not be heard).
22. See, e.g., 60 Fed. Reg. 17,902, 17,916 (I995) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 52) (al-
lowing required filings to be made in electronic form, rather than by express mail).
23. See 17 C.F.R. § 232.10-232.103 (setting forth the application and requirements of the
SEC's electronic filing program, EDGAR).
24. See, e.g., Anne Willette, IRS Says PC Filers Get Quicker Returns, USA TODAY, Feb.
8, 1996, at 1A.
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entity, but also the citizen seeking access to the information. Rather
than filing and waiting for a FOIA request, one can simply log onto a
computer and download publicly available information from home.
Computer technology has also assisted government accountability
by significantly empowering the "fifth estate" in promoting openness in
government. With the growth of databases like Nexis and Westlaw,
politicians can no longer change their views to suit their audience with-
out their inconsistencies being revealed-the database tells all. Simi-
larly, rookie reporters can gain immediate expertise through electronic
data searches, turning otherwise puff interviews into killer interroga-
tions. Technology, then, gives citizens the information they need to
compete with professional lobbyists; it gives people on the geographical
and political periphery the information resources required to compete
with those in the center.
B. Accountability Through Direct Democracy
According to traditional voting theory, voter participation is said
to serve several important functions in the operation of a democratic
system.25 First, high rates of participation legitimize the government's
power to rule.26 Second, participation is a way to empower the average
citizen.27 Third, informed participation in the political process has been
viewed as a way to stimulate the intellectual development of the citi-
zenry.28 These benefits, however, are only present with high rates of
participation. This paper argues that technology, besides promoting ac-
cess to the data needed to make democracy work, will also increase
government accountability by promoting mechanisms for direct democ-
racy. With advances in technology, interaction with the government be-
comes easier and, consequently, more citizens take part.29 Futurists
25. See generally Stephen Earl Bennett & David Resnick, The Implications of Nonvoting
for Democracy in the United States, 34 AM. J. POL. SCI. 771 (1990); M. MARGARET CONWAY,
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED STATES 189-90 (2d ed. 1990) (concluding that partici-
pation is a positive influence on the citizen's perception of government). This importance placed on
high participation counters the 1950s view that low participation reflected an unconcerned citizen
population. See WALTER DEAN BURNHAM, THE CURRENT CRISIS IN AMERICAN POLITICS 153
(1982).
26. Bennett & Resnick, supra note 25, at 773-74.
27. Id. at 774-75.
28. Id. at 775-76.
29. See JEFFREY B. ABRAMSON ET AL., THE ELECTRONIC COMMONWEALTH (1988) (examin-
ing methods by which it becomes easier for citizens to affect their leaders, and easier for leaders to
interact with their constituency); EDWIN DIAMOND & ROBERT A. SILVERMAN, WmTE HOUSE TO
YOUR HOUSE: MEDIA AND POLITICS IN VIRTUAL AMERICA 3, 91-93 (1995) (exploring the numer-
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have discussed this possibility for years.30 Some have spoken of voting
on candidates and issues from your TV set.31 Others, like Ross Perot,
have spoken of electronic town meetings.
Recently, we have had live examples of this hope that technology
can be applied to effectuate democratic principles:
-Alaska has created a Legislative Teleconferencing Network and a
Legislative Information Network.32 The Teleconferencing Network en-
ables citizens in remote areas to appear before the Alaskan assembly.33
The network also allows elected representatives to hold tele-discussions
with their constituents,34 and the Information Network allows citizens
to send messages to their legislators.35
-Building on a program developed in the 1980s in Hawaii,3s Jim
Fishkin has established a National Issues Convention,37 where a ran-
dom group of citizens will vote on issues, break into discussion groups,
and reconvene to vote again. He argues that this process of informing
voters enhances the operation of democracy, as the public too often
votes without a full understanding of the issues at stake.3s Fishkin in-
tends to use this program in the run-up to the 1996 election.39
-The city of Santa Monica has a public access computer network that
allows its residents to exchange electronic mail with the city (managers
are required to respond within 24 hours) and conduct transactions such
as acquiring building permits and licenses.4o
-Numerous World Wide Web home pages now allow citizens to access
OllS experiments bringing television to the voters).
30. See ABRAMSON ET AL., supra note 29, at 164-165.
31. Id.
32. GROSSMAN, supra note 9, at 156.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 156-57.
36. Hawaii's Televote program was an experiment whereby voters were asked to read mate-
rial on an issue and phone in their thoughts or votes. Id.
37. See JAMES S. FISHKIN, THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE: PUBLIC OPINION AND DEMOCRACY
(1995) (providing the text for a nationally televised discussion of issues).
38. Id. at 33-34. For a critical examination of Fishkin's theories about the proper operation
of democracy, see Phillip E. Converse, Fishkin's National Issues Convention Has Real Scientific
Merit, PUB. PERSP., Dec. 1995/Jan. 1996, at 11; Everett K. Ladd, Fishkin's "Deliberate Poll" Is
Flawed Science and Dubious Democracy, PUB. PERSP., Dec. 1995/Jan. 1996, at 41; Warren J.
Mitofsky, It's Not Deliberative and It's Not a Poll, PUB. PERSP., Dec. 1995/Jan. 1996, at 4;
Frank Newport, Why Do We Need a Deliberative Poll?, PUB. PERSP., Dec. 1995/Jan. 1996, at 7.
39. Nancy Kruh, Citizen Fishkin-Austin Professor Plans a Convention to Educate the
American Electorate, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 21, 1995, at lC.
40. See GROSSMAN, supra note 9, at 157; Julie Pitta, Electronic Democracy, FORBES, Oct.
I, 1990, at 132.
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information about state and city agency activities through the Internet.
These home pages have proliferated over the last year at the federal
level and have been a special project of both the White House and
House Speaker Gingrich.41
Of course, there are real dangers here. Hannah Arendt has written
that the rise of totalitarianism often is accompanied by the destruction
of mediating institutions, leaving citizens atomized to face the awesome
power of the state.42 As William Kornhauser has said: "Mass society is
objectively the atomized society,"43 available for manipulation by the
state. Thus far, however, the political fruits of technological change, be
it C-Span and Larry King, or the talk groups on the Internet, appear to
have promoted pluralism in the political system, even while bringing
citizens closer to the decision-making process.
C. Accountability Through Devolution
The principle of devolution, often called subsidiarity in the Euro-
pean Union context,44 is based on the notion that decisions made closest
to those affected are likely to be the best informed and certainly the
most democratically based. It suggests that actions to implement legiti-
mate government objectives should be taken at the lowest level of gov-
ernment capable of effectively addressing the problem.
This is not, of course, a new idea. The Anti-Federalists believed
that the effort to extend a single republic in the United States would
result in a loss of confidence in the legislature by the citizenry.45 As
former Senator Malcolm Wallop noted in a recent law review article,
there is a direct connection between the centralization of power and
governmental accountability.46 But with the advent of the New Deal
41. See Barbara J. Saffir, Exploring Federal Web Sites., WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 1995, at
A21; Bob Minzesheimer, Congress Signs on to the "Information Revolution," USA TODAY, Jan.
6, 1995, at 8A.
42. See HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 460 (1966) (stating that to-
talitarian governments "destroy ... all social, legal and political traditions of the country").
43. WILLIAM KORNHAUSER, THE POLITICS OF MASS SOCIETY 33 (1959).
44. George Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Commu-
nity and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 332 (1994).
45. See JACKSON T. MAIN, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS: CRITICS OF THE CONSTITUTION 129-30
(1974) (noting that this concern was a core principle of antifederalist thought); THE ANTIFEDER-
ALIST No. 14, at 36-38 (George Clinton) (Morton Borden ed., 1965) (expressing the belief that a
republican system required a small territory, and that a centralized government was inadequate to
represent the interests of such a geographically diverse population).
46. Malcolm Wallop, The Centralization of Power and Governmental Unaccountability, 4
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'y 487 (1995).
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and the growth of the administrative state, the constitutional principles
of federalism, our American version of subsidiarity, seemed to have be-
come moribund. Nonetheless, there is significant evidence that the tide
has turned.47 Both the Republican Congress and Bill Clinton have spo-
ken about the need for federalist solutions such as block grants to the
states for programs like welfare and law enforcement.48 Furthermore,
the revival of Tenth Amendment scholarship and several recent Su-
preme Court cases bear witness to this trend.
For the first time in fifty years, the Court in the Lopez case struck
down a statute on Commerce Clause grounds.49 In Gregory v. Ash-
croft,GO Justice O'Connor found in the Tenth Amendment a rule of
statutory interpretation requiring a heavy burden of showing that Con-
gress intended to overrule the states' "substantial sovereign power
under our constitutional scheme."G! In New York v. United States,
Congress had passed legislation requiring the states to dispose of low-
level radioactive waste.G2 The Court struck down the federal law, and,
in her majority opinion, O'Connor asserted that "[s]tate governments
are neither regional offices nor administrative agencies of the Federal
Government."GS
It is more than simply pedantry to note that this focus on devolu-
tion is an expression not only of conservative Republican politics, but of
"New Left" ideology as well. As it began in the sixties, the New Left,
was committed to the "increase [of] democracy in the economic, politi-
cal, and cultural life of the nation."G4 Participatory democracy was an
"early emphasis" of the New Left, before the movement became a
more radical, revolution-oriented group.GG For example, in his book
47. Still, there is a view that state and local governments are not ready to handle newly
devolved responsibilities. See Rochelle L. Stanfield, Holding the Bag?, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 9, 1995,
at 2206 (arguing that these more accountable government units lack the experience and know-how
to run the programs currently being considered for transfer from the federal government).
48. See Cops and Commerce, U.s. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 11, 1995, at 26 (speculating
that Clinton and Congress will agree to block grants for police spending); Elizabeth Shogren,
Clinton. as Promised, Vetoes GOP Welfare Bill, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 10, 1996, at A7 (re-
porting that Clinton accepts the structure of the welfare reform proposal-block grants to the
states).
49. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
50. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
51. ld. at 461.
52. 505 U.S. 144, 150-51 (1992).
53. ld. at 188.
54. EDWARD J. BACCIOCCO, JR., THE NEW LEFf IN AMERICA 109 (1974).
55. See JAMES L. WOOD, NEW LEFf IDEOLOGY: ITS DIMENSIONS AND DEVELOPMENT 6-7
(Sage Professional Papers in American Politics No. 04-022, 1975).
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Reveille for Radicals/56 Saul Alinsky sets forth the model "By-Laws of
the People's Organization."117 This proposed institution devolves power
to the local level, guaranteeing representation for "any organization
representative of the people ... in that area."lIs "All power to the peo-
ple" may be New Left language, but it also reflects the views of the
new conservative populism. Both believe in devolution to the most im-
mediate governing authority, the reduction of bureaucracy, and in-
creased government accountability.
Recent years have shown innumerable examples of how devolution
to the states and privatization have created not only a more efficient
government but one far more accountable to the public.1I9 These exam-
ples of devolution include recent efforts to promote "block grants" to
the states to fulfill welfare responsibilities,60 as well as efforts to shift
various environmental responsibilities to the states.61 Examples of
privatization of hitherto governmental functions include experiments
with school choice in Wisconsin62 and Pennsylvania,63 and privatization
of hospital systems in New York.64
At the same time, we have seen a proliferation of neighborhood
associations such as residential community associations (130,000 of
which regulated the lives of over 30 million residents by the end of the
1980s),611 as well as an explosion of special taxing districts parallel to
56. SAUL ALINSKY, REVEILLE FOR RADICALS (1946).
57. [d. at 221-28.
58. [d. at 222.
59. See WILLIAM D. EGGERS & JOHN O'LEARY, REVOLUTION AT THE ROOTS: MAKING
OUR GOVERNMENT SMALLER, BETTER AND CLOSER TO HOME 64 (1995) (arguing that devolution
results in "decentralizing government" and "transferring responsibility from government to indi-
viduals, families and voluntary associations."). These are not just conservative or Republican
ideas. See generally DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: How THE
ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR (1992); JACOB B. UKELES, Do-
ING MORE WITH LESS (1982).
60. See H.R. 4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). Title I of this bill is entitled "Block Grants
for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families."
61. See Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contempo-
rary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1142 (1995) (noting the recent shift toward increased state
responsibility and its potential impact on environmental policy).
62. EGGERS & O'LEARY, supra note 59, at 102-04.
63. [d. at 314-15; see also infra notes 101-106 and accompanying text.
64. [d. at 42.
65. Clayton P. Gillette, Courts. Covenants. and Communities, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1375,
1375 n.l (1994). This article sketches some of the legal issues inherent in residential community
associations. It focuses on the extent to which neighborhood associations can use "covenants" to
require uniformity in the lifestyle of members.
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local government, such as the 42nd Street Development Association,
through which business is better able to meet its specific needs.66
The modern distrust of bureaucratic and managerial expertise (re-
flected, as Jerry Mashaw suggests, in the National Performance Re-
view's effort to slim down and "flatten" the federal government67) will
not stop with the "reinventing government" effort of Vice President
Gore. Instead of this Gore effort to make government more efficient,
the focus of Newt Gingrich and congressional Republicans has been to
review what activities are the appropriate functions of govern-
ment-federal and state. Thus, there will be a need to develop criteria
to look at various levels of federal, state, and city government and de-
termine what core functions are best suited to each. There will be a
need as well for criteria to determine when government is being inap-
propriately overextended. As Cleveland Mayor Michael White, a Dem-
ocrat, has noted:
The city of Cleveland operates a convention center, two golf courses, and a
host of other assets which would make a private-sector operator a profit-but we
operate them at a loss. We are probably the only operator of parking lots in our
area who doesn't know how to make a profit on parking. Is it the height of heresy
to suggest that companies who run convention centers, manage jails, and manage
parking lots can deliver our constituents a better service at a better price?68
It is the burden of my argument that technology will make devolu-
tion more likely in the twenty-first century. That is to say, the shift of
government responsibility to smaller government units can, and will,
work far more successfully due to technology. In part, technology fos-
ters decentralization because computer networks and videoconferencing
permit interactive dialogue between persons on the periphery, thus re-
ducing the necessity of control by the center. In part, the fact that
technology flattens middle management empowers line workers and al-
lows for a wide variety of choices within the administrative state. For
the educational system to work, you need not have every student in
every classroom in France following the exact same lesson plan each
and every day. The same should be true with regulatory activity in
these United States.
66. See, e.g., Susan McGinn, Business Zones, Amid Questions, Gain Popularity, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 11, 1994, Section 13LI, at 1.
67. Jerry L. Mashaw, Reinventing Government and Regulatory Reform: Studies in the
Neglect and Abuse of Administrative Law, 57 U. PITT. L. REv. 405 (1996).
68. EGGERS & O'LEARY, supra note 59, at 41.
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III. ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
A. The Standard Paradigm
The central theoretical issue for administrative law in the twenti-
eth century has been the drive to curtail agency discretion both through
formalized adjudication procedures and judicial review. This fear of
empowering bureaucrats with flexibility reflects a traditional concern
that the administrative state, if unchecked, would likely act arbitrarily
and capriciously.
Historically, administrative law's effort to check discretion by pro-
cedure has encrusted government with inbuilt inefficiencies.
Proceduralism leads to defensive government, in which the focus is on
ensuring that improprieties do not occur in public service. As Jerry
Mashaw has shown in his studies of the welfare state, proceduralism
puts a premium on fairness.69 It also leads to centralized bureaucracy.
This, of course, is the purpose of much administrative procedure-to
ensure neutrality in the application of government power.
Let me give two brief examples. OSHA inspectors were histori-
cally understood to have no discretion in issuing citations when they
saw cause for complaint.70 Any decisions to reduce penalties or waive
prosecution had to be made by attorneys for OSHA (in the Solicitor's
office). This lack of discretionary authority probably reflected indus-
try's fears that OSHA inspectors possessed too much authority. The
result has been continual complaints about the regulatory nightmare of
OSHA. Under pressure from the Republican Congress, the Clinton ad-
ministration has found that the OSHA inspectors do have some discre-
tionary authority and have started to develop waiver programs for com-
panies in substantial compliance or who are in a cooperating mode.71
Similarly, much of the federal procurement process has been
designed to use procedural safeguards to protect against favoritism and
69. See JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE 171-72 (1983); JERRY L. MASHAW,
DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 158-60 (1985); Jerry L. Mashaw, "Rights" in the
Federal Administrative State, 92 YALE L.J. 1129, 1132 (1983).
70. See 29 U.S.C. § 658(a) (1988) (stating that the inspector, upon finding a violation,
"shall . .. issue a citation to the employer") (emphasis added); BENJAMIN W. MINTZ, OSHA:
HISTORY, LAW, AND POLICY 358, 482 (1984). Mintz notes that OSHA is "based on the principle
that compliance inspections ... are followed by inspections and penalties." [d. at 358. He notes
that OSHA has interpreted the "shall" language in the statute quoted as "mandatory, thus pre-
cluding on site, sanction-free consultation by OSHA representatives." [d. at 482 n.l.
71. See OSHA Policy on Written Program Violations Seeks "Consistent Enforcement" of
Standards, O.s.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at 828 (Nov. 15, 1995).
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corruption. But as Steven Kelman, in the Administration of the Office
of Federal Procurement Policy, has pointed out:
We should deal with corruption directly by very strict criminal sanctions. We
should put corrupt people in jail for a long time. But you don't want to make the
system so inefficient on a daily basis that it make [sic] the lives of the 99.5
percent of honest people impossible. You don't fight corruption by creating an
awful procurement system.'12
New efforts at procurement reform are starting to take this point into
consideration.73 Allowing federal agencies to buy "off the rack" and
simplifying how the government specifies the goods and services it
wants by streamlining the writing of procurement specifications not
only saves millions of dollars in employee time, but also empowers line
employees to use their flexibility in solving problems. However, while
these reforms will increase efficiency, they may well increase the possi-
bility of unfair results in specific instances.
Some of the tensions in empowering bureaucracy can be seen in
Philip Howard's recent best seller, The Death of Common Sense.74
Howard cites numerous examples of foolishness by government bureau-
crats. He points to the example of Mother Theresa, whose missionaries
of charity set aside $500,000 to renovate an abandoned building for the
homeless in the Bronx.75 The nuns did not believe that modern conve-
niences such as the dishwasher, washing machine, or elevator were nec-
essary.76 The project ran aground on the city's demand that they spend
$100,000 for an elevator which they would never use.77 After two years
Mother Theresa wrote the city that "[t]he Sisters felt they could use
the money much more fruitfully for soup and sandwiches," noting that
the episode "served to educate us about the law and its many
complexities."78
While Howard's complaint could have been written by Newt
Gingrich, Howard offers a different solution. Althoueh a severe critic
of the bureaucratic process, he does not propose fewer rules or no rules;
nor does he propose more detailed rules and more aggressive judicial
72. EGCllRS & O'LEARY, s-lprt: note 59, at 143.
73. See Kathleen Day, Stream/inine Procurement Begins Phase 2, WASr:I. POST, Feb. 9,
1!>!I~, at A19.
74. PmLIr K. HOWAI.o, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE (1994).
75. !d. at :l.
76. Id. at 4.
77. ;(1.
78. Id.
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review. Instead, his remedy would empower bureaucrats by giving them
more responsibility (or in administrative law terms more discretion) to
take matters into their own hands.79 He wants to give the bureaucrats
flexibility to waive rules or not to waive rules, to accept individuated
compliance solutions, and ignore the letter of the law to accomplish its
"spirit."80
Tracking Howard, the state of Florida has proposed a repeal of at
least half of Florida's 28,750 rules by the end of the 1996 legislative
session in favor of guidelines that will devolve greater discretion on
agency officials.81 These efforts, however, have achieved only limited
success, because the governor has vetoed a bill to reform the rule-mak-
ing process, while still searching for superfluous rules.82 The Canadian
Parliament has before it legislation that allows persons subject to regu-
lations to propose alternative compliance plans that still meet the "reg-
ulatory goals of the designated regulation."83
In contrast, much of the regulatory reform effort by Republicans
over the last year has reflected a fear of empowering bureaucrats to do
just about anything without checking procedures. Thus, the regulatory
reform bill introduced by Senator Bob Dole looked to the judiciary to
provide accountability for bureaucratic decision making, a somewhat
unusual approach for avowed opponents of judicial activism.84 The va-
rious iterations of this bill and its Contract with America analogues
offer extensive, some say innumerable, opportunities for judicial review
as a way of checking agency action. They provide review, for example,
of the substance as well as the form of agency cost/benefit analyses
and agency decisions to characterize rules as "major" or "minor."85
These legislative proposals also attain accountability by making
use of "sunset" provisions, in which a regulation loses force after a cer-
tain number of years and must be reauthorized, and "look-back" provi-
sions, by which a member of the regulated community can ask or re-
quire an agency to review the efficacy of a particular rule at any time,
79. ld. at 180.
80. ld.
81. William Booth. Florida Seeks End to Rule by the Book, WASH. losT, Mar. 14, 1995,
'it 1.
8:.'. See Craig Quintana, Chiles Scuttles Regulatory-Reform Bill, O~LANDO SENTINEL,
July 13, 1995, at Cl (reporting the governor's claim thrt his agencies have identified nearly 3,400
rules for reyp.al, ul'd azencies controlled by thl' Florida Cabinet have idA:Jtified anothc.r 2,600).
83. House of Commons, Bill C-62, l~t Sess., 35th Parliament (1st reading Dec. 6, 1994).
<34. S. 343, 104th Cor-g., 1st Sess. (1995).
85. /('. (proposi'1~ 5 U.S.C. §§ 622-625).
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perhaps even when the rule is about to be enforced on that party.86
Further, the Dole bill not only allows for more extensive judicial review
of agency action, it would also require that proposed agency regulations
be brought back to Congress and "laid on the table,"87 where Congress
would have the opportunity to enact a "two-house" veto, clearly consti-
tutional even under Chadha.88 Indeed the regulatory reform enthusiasts
so distrust bureaucrats that they would codify executive branch review
(and control) of agency rulemaking that includes peer review by
outside scientists (including industry scientists) of the findings of
agency experts who conduct cost/benefit analysis.89
In my view, technology will increase the opportunities for enlarged
yet "structured" discretion. It allows Congress to be clearer in its goals
and, in turn, to empower administrators with the flexibility needed to
achieve those goals. We must remember that administrative courts first
developed because of the need to make decisions heavily laden with
changing social science facts. We now have coherent ways to master
changing factual data. Thus, the opportunities for Congress to "double-
check" regulatory goals will make it easier to accept a broader range of
discretion by bureaucrats.
B. Emerging Issues in Administrative Law
If my views about technology and devolution are accurate, we are
likely to see a very different set of issues facing the regulatory process.
We will see, for example, a rebirth of interest in state and local admin-
istrative law, a subject shockingly ignored by most elite academics (the
exceptions, of course, being Arthur Bonfield,90 Harold Levinson,91 and
86. See S. 343, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a) (1995) (which includes a "look-back" provi-
sion as part of the proposed Comprehensive Regulatory Reform Act).
87. Id. (proposing 5 U.S.C. § 801).
88. INS v. Chadha, 454 U.S. 812 (1981).
89. S. 343, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a) (1995) (proposing 5 U.S.C. § 640, which would
establish a program by w' ich agency experts and their findings would be reviewed by another
panel of scientists). A separate bill would codify traditional OMB review of proposed regulations.
See S. 291, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 403(b) (1995).
90. See. e.g., Arthu. E. B'lnfield, The Quest for an Ideal State Administrative Rulemaking
Procedure, 18 FLA. ST. C. L. REV. 617 (1991); Arthur E. Bonfield, State Administrative Policy
Formulation and the Choice ofLawmaking Methodology, 42 ADMIN. L. REv. 121 (1990); Arthur
E. Bonfield, The Federal APA and State Administra:ive Law, 72 VA. L. REV. 297 (1986); Arthur
E. Jonfield, StatD Law in ,'he Tea~hing ofAdminist:-ative La....: A Critical .inalysis of ,'he Status
Quo, 61 TEX. L. REV. 95 (1982). See also ARTHUlt E. BONFIELD & MICHAEL AsIMOW, SHTE
AND FEDERAL AD"UNl:;'" • ...TlVE LAW (1989).
91. Sf!e. e.g., Harole Levinson, Mcrking Society's Legal System Accessible t:J Society: The
~ver's Role and Implications, 41 '.'AND. L. REV. 789 (1.988); Harold Levin~on,Legislative and
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Michael Asimow92). I say shocking because in the last twenty-five
years some of the most creative innovations in administrative law have
been at the state level. The systems to provide centralized review of
proposed state regulations in Arizona and California, which are, in
many respects, far more sophisticated than OMB's approach, are but
one example.93
It is hard for administrative lawyers to accept subsidiarity since, of
course, we are in the business of rationalizing, not eradicating, central-
ized power. Nonetheless, the fact is that the devolution of government
creates numerous issues of administrative law, particularly if one's goal
is devolution with accountability. Some of these issues are presented
below.
1. Issues of Preemption
In the past twenty years, the prevailing jurisprudential notion has
been that federal preemption is a doctrine that should be implemented
in an expansive spirit.94 To do otherwise would be to condemn regu-
lated business to a skein of 50 different state rules. Further, lacking
any central control, there would be a "race to the bottom" in creating
and enforcing regulations. Rick Revesz has convincingly shown that
this is not true regarding state environmental regulation915 and that
there is reason to believe this analysis would prove correct in other reg-
ulatory areas as well.96
Executive Veto of Rules of Administrative Agencies: Models and Alternatives, 24 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 79 (1982).
92. See, e.g., Michael Asimow, California Underground Regulations, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 43
(1992); Michael Asimow, Toward a New California Administrative Procedure Act: Adjudication
Fundamentals, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1067 (1992).
93. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1051-41-1057 (Supp. 1995) (establishing a gover-
nor's regulatory review council); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 11349-11349.6 (Deering Supp. 1996) (es-
tablishing a procedure for review of proposed regulations).
94. See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Regulatory Competition, Regulatory
Capture, and Corporate Self-Regulation, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1861, 1862 (1995) (advocating "partial
federal preemption of state law's allocation to management of agenda control ove, corporate char-
ter amendments"); William W. Buzzbee, Remembering Repose: Voluntary Contamination
Cleanup Approvals, Incentiver, and the Costs of Interminable Liability, 80 MIl-lN. L. REV. 35,
HI (1995) (noting that the "frst wave" of scholarship favored federal preemption in the environ-
mental context).
95. See Rick Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: .~ethink:ng the "I.:lce to the
Bettom" Ratim.alefor Federal Environm'!ntal Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992) (argu-
inJ tha~ h.terstate comoetitic 1 may 1D facL benefit the caust" of environ••lental regulation).
Q6. Id. a 125:-54 (suggesting thai. similar application of "race to the bottom" a'lalysis is
utilized '.~ the ar~a of corporate la,").
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2. Private/Public Cooperation
As Daniel Boorstin has suggested, Americans are a nation of join-
ers.97 Alexis de Tocqueville points out that
Americans make associations to give entertainments, to found seminaries, to
build inns, to construct churches, to diffuse books, to send missionaries to the
antipodes; in this manner they found hospitals, prisons, and schools. . . . Wher-
ever at the head of some new undertaking you see the government in France, or
a man of rank in England, in the United States you will be sure to find an
association.S8
More and more, government is devolving social welfare functions
from rigid state bureaucracies to charitable associations. These charita-
ble associations range from Catholic Charities and the Jewish Federa-
tion to neighborhood associations cleaning up and protecting their local
neighborhoods. Senator Daniel Coats has encouraged this approach by
proposing a tax credit of up to $500 ($1,000 for joint filers) to individu-
als donating both time and money to social service provider charities,
which undertake many of the welfare tasks hitherto pursued by the
government.99 At least one recent iteration of the Dole welfare bill
would allow religious institutions to receive federal monies for this
purpose.100
Developing rules for private involvement in previously public func-
tions will be a growth area for administrative law and a challenge for
government accountability. The growth of private sector entities which
fulfill public functions creates numerous issues for the traditional ad-
ministrative law paradigm. Public procurement rules could strangle pri-
vate sector procurement; yet issues of fairness and accountability can-
not be ignored.
3. The Administrative Procedure of Privatization
As the private sector begins to take over formerly governmental
functions, a large number of issues arise r~garding whether these new
97. See DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE AME:UCANS: THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE 49-50 (1967).
98. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 2 DEM")CRACY IN AMERICA 106 (Phillips Bradley trans., AI
fred A. Kno?f 1994) (1840).
99. Se'! 141 COtIG. REC S12906-07 (daily eJ. Sc.pt. 8, 1995) (statc.ment of Sen. Coats)
(describing the Coats !lnlendment and its tax creJit). See generally William J. B'mnett & Dan
Coats, Movi'l~ Beyond Devolut,'on, WALL ST. J., Sept. 5, 1995, at A14 (d:scus~ir.g the theory of
devolution to charitable institt.ticns .md inaividuals, which is th~ theory behind the tax credit).
100. S. 1120, 10~th CO!!";., 1st Sess. § 102(a) (1995) (albwing state~ to contract \'"/ith reli-
gi(l\;s Olganizat'ons "'0 providt. ~t,rv;ces and administer programs").
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entities are to be run by private or public sector rules.lOl Issues of tort
liability, sovereign immunity, and procurement policy are affected by
the choice between public and private regimes.
A glimpse into the kinds of issues to be addressed can be seen in
an example close to Pittsburgh-the Wilkinsburg school privatization
experiment.l02 Two of the many issues related to that experiment are of
particular interest to administrative lawyers: the selection process for
contractors and the status of the "public" (or at least formerly public)
work staff.
In the Wilkinsburg case, the school board contracted out an entire
school's teaching function to a private company. lOS However one views
the result, the selection process was open and transparent, with the
school board sending out requests for proposals with no preconceived
private bidder in mind.l04 There was a level playing field. The school
board then hired an arm's-length consulting firm to review and grade
suitable bids.lOI> As these kinds of privatizations expand, the "law" of
the selection process will become increasingly relevant.
As to jobs, some of the former "public" employees in Wilkinsburg
were laid off as the new "private" company brought on its own manag-
ers and line staff,106 raising interesting questions about the nature of
public employment. The administrative law of privatization will have to
develop criteria for what responsibilities, if any, the formerly public
companies will have to the existing workforce.
The recent phenomenon of the mixed public/private corporation
provides still more confusion on the issue of what law to apply.l07 In
cases of federal government corporations and the Agency for Interna-
tional Development investment funds, there is no clear answer as to
101. Marianne Lavelle, Public Works Go Private, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 25, 1995, at 1 (noting
that the privatization of public works raises the question of whether the entity is governed by
private or public law).
102. See Monica L. Haynes & Roger Stuart, All is Quiet During First Day of Classes at
Turner School, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 6, 1995, at C1 (aescribing the circumstances of the
Wilkinsburg schec.. Doard's decision to privatize one of its elementary schools).
103. Monica L. Haynes &. t.1atthew P. Smith, Company to Run School; Wilkinsburg
Board Approves Private Cont-act to Run Turner, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 22, 1~:>5, at B1.
104. ld.
W5. ld.
106. See Monica L. Haynes, Two Dozen Wilkinsbu. g Teacl :.s Furlougtled, i>' iT. POl>T-
GAZETT5, July 26, 1995, at AI.
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whether the entity is public or private.1os This raises important ques-
tions of accountability because, when public money is involved, the pos-
sibility of potential taxpayer liability must be addressed.109 This prob-
lem is not peculiar to the American system. Great Britain faces similar
questions of classification and accountability with what it terms
"quangos," which are semiautonomous business units fulfilling what
have historically been viewed as public purposes.no
IV. CONCLUSION
The last hundred years of the University of Pittsburgh School of
Law celebrated in this centennial have been largely the century of the
administrative state. Many believe that the trajectory will continue in-
definitely. Such a path, however, can only lead to statism, which is in-
consistent, as Hayek has shown, with personalliberty.1l1 As this article
suggests, the administrative state will face new challenges and take on
new forms in the twenty-first century. Advances in technology and the
increased devolution of governmental activity to cities, states, and the
private sector will increase government accountability while still em-
powering agency officials with the discretion they need to do their jobs
creatively and effectively. That is the structure of government account-
ability I believe our children will be talking about at the symposium for
the 200th anniversary of the University of Pittsburgh School of Law.
Certainly it is the structure of government accountability we should
strive for.
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REV. 543, 605-14 (1995) (discussing issues of inconsistent treatment and accountability of federal
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Authority, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 1996, at A19 (describing the issues raised when public funds are
involved in a nominally private operation).
109. See THOMAS H. STANTON, SAYING GOODBYE WHEN THE JOB IS DONE: THE COMING
PRIVATIZATION OF GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ENTERPRISES 4-5 (1995) (arguing for complete
privatization because of potential taxpayer liability).
llO. See CAROL HARLOW & RiCHARD RAWLINGS, LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 32-34
(1934).
lli. See FIl.IEDRICH A VON HAYEK, THE ROAI) TO SERFDOM (1941).
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